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In spite of considerable attention granted to sovereign debt failures, we still have limited knowledge of
the incentives which induced creditors to lend at unsustainable levels. This article looks at the French
government’s policy towards Poland from , when economic cooperation between the two coun-
tries started, until Poland’s announcement in  that it could not service its debt. Export credit guar-
antees supported France’s financial involvement, and this implied the government’s strong influence on
the decision to lend. This article brings out the tension between economic and political priorities in
French policymaking during the cold war. Archival evidence reveals that as early as  the French
finance ministry warned that French risks were excessive; that Poland’s growing economic difficulties
would render the country unable to repay its debts; and recommended limiting France’s financial com-
mitments. The French government, however, decided not only to carry on but also to increase lending,
in order to support its political objective of using economic and financial means to relax East–West ten-
sions. This article illustrates how creditors play a part in sovereign debt crises by voluntarily turning a blind
eye to a country’s growing inability to repay its debts, and thus reinforce a vicious circle of indebtedness.
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Sovereign defaults attract considerable scholarly attention. Debt rescheduling and
renegotiation, structural adjustment programmes and incentives for a debtor to
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default are all scrutinised in detail. But as Juan Flores () recently noted, the pre-
dominant focus remains on analysing the responsibilities and behaviour of the debtor
in the crisis. Incentives for a creditor to lend excessively are more rarely taken into
detailed consideration in the overall analysis of the causes of a debt crisis. With
respect to the Latin American debt crisis of , Altamura and Flores () thus
notice that most studies still place responsibility for the crisis with the macroeconomic
deterioration of the situation in the respective countries, rather than with possible
incentives from the governments and banks to have lent excessively to Latin
American countries in the first place (two exceptions areWellons ; Devlin ).
The same reasoning holds in the case of the Polish debt crisis. In March , the
Polish authorities notified their Western creditors that they were no longer able to
repay their debts. The consensual view to explain why Poland ran into financial trou-
bles centres on Polish first secretary Edward Gierek’s policy to attract Western finan-
cial investments from the early s. In spite of succeeding in gaining significant
financial inflows into Poland, the Polish authorities proved unable to reform the
country’s economic system. The worsening of the macroeconomic context and the
deterioration of Poland’s terms of trade with the West rendered Poland unable to
gain the hard currency it needed to repay its external debt (Poznanski ;
Siwin ́ski ; Kamin ́ski ; Lissakers ; Kotkin , pp. –; Jarza ̨bek
). But the fact that credit may have flowed into Poland in excessive quantity
because of the creditors’ conscious disregard of those Polish economic weaknesses
is overlooked. Kotkin (, p. ) thus explains that ‘the  oil shock, on top
of the inherent wastefulness and nonmarket rigidity of planning, bludgeoned the bor-
rowing strategy [of the Polish authorities]’, but does not develop the idea that the
West may have lent excessively. While Lissakers (, pp. –) does mention the
eagerness of banks to lend to Poland, she does not discuss the governments’ degree
of awareness of Poland’s difficult economic situation, and the most important factor
identified remains the failure of Gierek’s strategy. Poznanski is even more straightfor-
ward in putting the blame on Poland alone: ‘it was Poland’s inability to institute an
adjustment policy which worsened the crisis far beyondwhat onewould have predicted
on the basis of Gierek’s policy alone’ (, p. ). Similarly, Zloch-Christy writes that
‘the “new development strategy” failed because of the systemic inability of the Polish
planning authorities to implement it properly’, and later adds some external factors
including oil-price shocks, deteriorating terms of trade, global recession, or credit
squeeze (, pp. , –). The entire section on the ‘causes and consequences of
the crisis’ in Poland in Marer and Siwiński () does not consider the creditors’
lending at unsustainable levels, nor does a book published nearer to the outbreak of
the crisis in  (Landau andTomaszewski , p. ). In short, the onus of the finan-
cial debacle primarily lies on Poland. Linked to this is the fact that the literature focuses on
the debt crisis sensu stricto, that is, the debt renegotiations and rescheduling starting in
. Analysis of the Polish travails starts once the accumulation of debt had already
become unsustainable. Bartel (; see also James , p. ; Boughton ,
pp. –) thus analyses the role of banks in the - period, once the Polish debt
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situation was already critical. The changing context that followed the imposition of
martial law in December , with its significant economic, political and cold war
implications, further contributes to overshadow the importance of the financial
context pre- (Sjursen ; Domber ; Tavani ).
Two exceptions to this are Portes’ article in Foreign Affairs and Badel’s work on French
foreign trade diplomacy.1 Both identify  as the turning point when a feweconomists
and policymakers would have started to worry about the situation. In his July 
article, Portes wrote that ‘The economic strategy chosen in - is largely compro-
mised, and with it Poland’s ability to avert debt rescheduling at the end of the
decade’ (p. ). An article in Institutional Investor lists other such cases of economists
warning of Poland’s difficulties (Baird and Delamaide ). Were these economists
really alone in thinking so? In an article on risk and the French state, Badel (b,
p. ) deals very briefly with the case of Polish debt. Badel focuses on the attitude of
the Élysée palace alone, and does not provide evidence that other parts of the French
administration were aware of the situation. Badel does not cover the reactions of the
finance and foreign ministries, and concludes that until  the French authorities
were not alarmed about the situation, a point this article aims to qualify.2
By contrast, this article reveals that not only the French Treasury but also the French
embassy in Warsaw alerted their respective ministries to the economic difficulties of
Poland and its struggle to service its debt as early as  and  respectively.
From then on, the French Treasury regularly warned the French minister of econom-
ics and finance about the gradual improbability that Poland would honour its debt
commitments in time, if at all. This goes against Portes’ claim that ‘this new
East-West economic interdependence now clearly demands the policy analysis
which ideally should have preceded it’ (, p. ). The French government did
develop its own policy analysis before getting involved, but consciously chose to pri-
oritise political objectives associated with supporting Poland over the economic and
financial risks taken. A close look at the French government’s detailed economic ana-
lysis of the Polish situation only reinforces the argument that French lending was done
at unsustainable levels, and that the French government turned a blind eye to the
unsustainability of the Polish situation to preserve the longer-term détente process.
Situated at the crossroads of three fields of research – sovereign lending, cold war
history, and history of French international economic relations – this article contri-
butes to bringing out the tension between the economic and political priorities in
French policymaking in a cold war world. In order to retrace French foreign policy-
making and thinking on the topic, this article is based on archival material from the
several divisions of the French administration involved in the policymaking process,
1 In his recent archive-based account Bartel also writes that ‘hints of looming financial catastrophe began
to emerge in ’; see Bartel , pp. –.
2 In her book on French commercial diplomacy, Badel further develops this case but mostly to present
the early development of Franco-Polish economic relations, and use the samematerial and conclusions
as in the article; see Badel a, pp. –, –.
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namely, two divisions of the French foreign ministry (Direction Europe, DE, and
Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, DAEF), two divisions of the finance min-
istry (Trésor, and Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures, DREE), as well as the
Banque de France.3 Section II situates the French case within the wider context of
Western lending to the East. Section III briefly analyses the early development of eco-
nomic and financial connections between France and Poland from the late s until
Gierek’s new economic policy. Section IV scrutinises the setting up of the first
Franco-Polish financial protocol of , and the start of French government-backed
lending to Poland. Section V delves into the question of the renewal of the  finan-
cial protocol for a further three-year period, from  to , and highlights the
French government’s awareness of Polish financial difficulties. The sixth section
looks into the final stages before the Polish authorities’ official announcement in
March  that they could not reimburse their debts; Section VII concludes.
I I
Lending to Poland occurred against the backdrop of the cold war’s détente process.
The cold war, understood as the competition between the capitalist West and the
socialist East, lasted from the late s until  (Westad , pp. –). From
the late s until the late s, the two superpowers – the United States and
the USSR – underwent a period of relaxation of tensions known as détente. The
process of détente encouraged the development of links – economic, financial, cul-
tural – across the Iron Curtain. Détente highlighted that the division of the world into
blocs was not permanent. In the specific European context, Western and Eastern
European countries were keen to overcome the cold war order by developing such
links. In particular, they were keen to do this regardless of the superpowers’ confron-
tation (see, for instance, Loth ; Romano ; Bange and Villaume ).
Intensifying commercial and financial relations was thus part and parcel of that strat-
egy. Several Western countries were involved in lending to Poland. Banks and gov-
ernments from France, Italy, the UK, the US and West Germany were among the
most important lenders (Cohen ; Frieden ). Against the background of
détente, Western governments were keen to see Eastern European countries
borrow on international capital markets, and supported them in doing so; while
the regimes of Eastern Europewere seeking finance in order to improve living standards
(Loth , pp. –; Bartel , pp. –). In each of theWestern countries, ten-
sions equally existed between the fulfilment of their economic and political objectives,
the full analysis of which goes well beyond the scope of one single journal article.
But why look specifically at France and Poland? Poland was the largest Eastern
European country. Among the various creditors involved in Poland, France stood
3 The French exports credit guarantee department (COFACE, Compagnie française d’assurance pour le
commerce extérieur) did not have autonomous decision-making power. OnCOFACE, see Saul ,
.
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out for its large use of export credit guarantees. The use of export finance meant the
strong implication, and backing, of the French state in financial transactions since the
state insures against non-payment. By , in terms of share of guaranteed credits on
total gross indebtedness towards France, Poland was indeed second only to the USSR
(Table ). Finally, Francewas one of the chief advocates of the détente process. French
president Charles de Gaulle was a vigorous proponent of the détente policy, and sup-
ported an independent foreign policy aimed at developing France’s connections with
Eastern European countries. France and Poland had a long tradition of political
friendship that some date back to the Napoleonic period, and both countries
enjoyed numerous cultural links.4 Of all Eastern European socialist countries,
Poland was the one with which the French government claimed to have the
closest and the best relations. From a Polish point of view, the strategy was to open
up to the West, but also to slow down the West German penetration induced by
this opening and compensate for it with the greater involvement of the traditional
French ally.5 In , West Germany’s market share in Poland was no less than
. per cent, while that of all other Western countries was between . (Japan)
and . per cent (UK) (Table ). Polish authorities also appreciated France’s avow-
edly independent foreign policy, in that they considered it was a reliable resource in
the superpower confrontation. As the French foreign ministry put it: ‘in their concern
to leave the tête-à-tête with the USSR, they [the Poles] see in us the least








USSR , , ,
Poland , , ,
GDR  , ,
Romania , , ,
Hungary  , ,
Bulgaria  , ,
Czechoslovakia  , ,
Total (COMECON countries) , , ,
Yugoslavia , , ,
Source: AMAE, DE/, Aide à la Pologne,  March .
4 See, for instance, Pomian ; Boel . Polish first secretary Edward Gierek was raised and edu-
cated in France, and Michel Poniatowski, one of the politicians closest to Giscard, was of Polish
descent.
5 Archives duMinistère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter AMAE), DE-CE/, Relations économiques
franco-polonaises,  November .
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compromising European partner, due to the attachment we show to our national
independence’.6
Why was lending to Eastern European countries in general, and Poland in particu-
lar, so appealing to the West? Many assumptions about Eastern European regimes,
stereotypical but widespread, played an important role in the decision of Western
countries and banks to lend. Among such assumptions feature first the perception
about the alleged rock-like stability of communist regimes, which reassured
lenders. Second, the reputation of these regimes for fiscal conservatism and perfect
debt-servicing track records further made lending to Eastern Europe look like a safe
investment (Terry ). Third, French authorities did not rank Poland in the classic
category of ‘developing country’, which might have instilled more caution in their
thinking about it.7 Finally, the so-called umbrella theory, according to which the
Soviet Union would come to the rescue were an Eastern European country running
into trouble, provided a sort of safety net in the mind of Western investors.8
The use of specific financial mechanisms (export credit guarantees and financial
credits) to support the economic (search for new markets) and political (détente)
motivations for French investment in Poland contributed to minimise the risk
taken by firms and banks. The direct consequence of the French government’s
Table 2. Trade between Poland and main Western countries (million dollars)

Import from Poland Export to Poland Market share %
West Germany   .
France   .
UK  . .
Italy  . .
US  . .
Japan  . .
Total , ,. 
Source: Centre des Archives économiques et financières (hereafter CAEF), B/,
Ministère de l’économie et des finances, Le commerce extérieur polonais et les relations
commerciales franco-polonaises, undated (c. ).
6 AMAE, DE/, Direction des affaires politiques (hereafter DAP), Europe, Relations franco-
polonaises,  November .
7 AMAE, DE/, Ministère des relations extérieures, Direction d’Europe (hereafter DE), Situation
économique de la Pologne,  July .
8 Sjursen , p. ; and ‘Paper by East European and Soviet Department on the “Umbrella Theory”:
Soviet reaction to the possibility of a Polish default,  March ’, in Tombs and Smith ,
pp. –.
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predominant use of export credit guarantees was that its decision may have relied on a
broader set of factors, including grand strategy (détente in a cold war world) and a
more classic cost–benefit analysis (support the finding of new markets for French
exports). Evidence of this can be found in the reflections within the French foreign
ministry itself. Shortly after Poland announced to its Western creditors in  that
it was not able to repay its debts, a note from the French foreign ministry, outlining
the reasons why the French government should help Poland, read: ‘There is a moral
reason [why France should help Poland]: we have a degree of responsibility in the
current situation, in that the megalomaniac policy of Edward Gierek has been facili-
tated by the French financial generosity [largesse] in the period - in particular.’9
The French therefore saw themselves as sharing a degree of responsibility in the
making of the Polish debt crisis, which is a rare acknowledgement coming from a
lender in such a situation.
I I I
From the s the French government started to actively promote French exports,
through a mixture of political and commercial diplomacy.10 Against the backdrop of
cold war détente, Eastern European countries in general and Poland in particular were
important parts of that strategy (see, for instance, Bouillon ). In the same period,
first secretary Gomulka had already started the process of Poland’s reopening to the
West, before Edward Gierek (Jarza ̨bek ). This nascent economic cooperation
materialised with the signature of several trade agreements in the s between
the two countries, which paved the way for the more intense cooperation of the
Gierek era during the s. But importantly in comparison with the later period,
as Jarza ̨bek (, p. ) notes, ‘Gomulka was not eager to finance modernisation
with the use of loans and credits’, unlike Gierek from .
At the earliest, the French government’s interest in Poland dates back to ,
when Paris considered financing a project for a coal mine.11 France was the first
Western country to sign such an agreement with Poland in July  (Jarza ̨bek
, p. ). Two other agreements followed suit, in October , and then in
May .12 These agreements were part of a wider pattern that the French govern-
ment was pursuing at the time and dubbed ‘neo-bilateralism’ (Badel , p. ).
The French government was encouraging an increase in bilateral economic cooper-
ation explicitly aimed at supporting French exports. De Gaulle’s official visit to Poland
9 AMAE, DE/, Ministère des relations extérieures, DE, Sous-direction d’Europe orientale, Les pays
occidentaux et l’aide à la Pologne,  August .
10 For a detailed analysis of this see Badel , , a.
11 But the project was eventually not pursued; see CAEF, B/, Compte-rendu de la réunion chez
de Margerie le  octobre  au sujet du financement d’une mine de charbon à coke.
12 AMAE, DE-CE/, Commission intergouvernementale de coopération économique franco-
polonaise, Évolution des structures de la coopération économique franco-polonaise, October .
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in , a year after his visit to the USSR, contributed to relaunching Franco-Polish
relations politically.13 New agreements between the two countries followed suit in
.14 They provided privileged credit conditions, and contributed to momentarily
reducing the Polish trade deficit (Table ).
Coming to power in , Gierek decided on a new economic strategy for Poland.
Against the backdrop of domestic economic dissatisfaction, Gierek decided to boost
Poland’s economic growth by improving the supply of consumer goods and food,
and thus raising the standard of living. Large-scale borrowing from the West – some-
thing that Gomulkawas reluctant to accept –would be the cornerstone of this new eco-
nomic strategy. Over the years, Polish policy did not just consist of opening up to the
West, but also, within that framework, the aim was to compensate for West Germany’s
influence by developing relations with other Western European countries, and France
in particular. Polish authorities were thus eager to sign bilateral multi-annual industrial,
scientific and technical ‘cooperation agreements’ with Western European countries
(Jarząbek , pp. –). From , the Commission of the European Economic
Community (EEC) took over the competence to sign new trade agreements with
EEC member states (Romano ).15 Such bilateral agreements were therefore care-
fully drafted so as to circumvent the EEC’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP).16
Table 3. Evolution of French trade with Poland (million francs)
Year        
Imports        
Exports        
Volume       , ,
Balance + + + + + + − +
   a  
 , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
+ + +, +, + −
a Data available on  months only.
Source: AMAE, DE-CE/ to , author’s calculations based on multiple notes.
13 AMAE, DE/, DAP, Europe, Relations franco-polonaises,  November .
14 AMAE, DE-CE/, DAEF, La coopération économique et industrielle franco-polonaise,  April
.
15 The different Franco-Polish protocols have been negotiated as part of a special procedure agreed upon
for relations with Eastern European countries by the EEC Council on  December .
16 On the question of circumventing EEC constraints, see Badel a, pp. –.
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IV
What framework did the French and Polish governments agree upon to formalise
their financial relations, and materialise Gierek’s policy towards the West? After
 and the materialisation of Gierek’s  new policy with the signature of con-
crete cooperation agreements between the two countries, long-term cooperation was
increasingly tied to financial facilities. The Polish government asked the French to
conclude a long-term (-year) cooperation agreement as France did with the
USSR.17 The agreement was signed on  June  in Warsaw, and nicknamed
Gierek . The agreement provided a general framework aimed at encouraging
greater Franco-Polish cooperation in all sorts of economic, industrial, scientific and
technical domains. The economic analysis provided ahead of the first meeting of
the newly created Mixed Commission for Franco-Polish Economic Cooperation
gathering French and Polish ministers was already very cautious: ‘Fragile inside,
Polish economic development becomes more and more dependent on an external
contribution while its exporting capacity does not allow a satisfactory balance.’18
In October , a confidential financial protocol came to complement the June
 agreement, and set out the financial conditions for Franco-Polish relations.
Financial conditions were, as in the  agreement, privileged. By the same
mechanism (lowering the risk premium on export credit), the rate for credits up
to five years was . per cent lower than the regular rate, while credits up to
seven years and beyond were . per cent lower than the regular rate. The finan-
cial protocol of  originally included credits up to . billion francs under pri-
vileged conditions (at rates lower than the regular ones). This amount was
increased to . billion in October , then to . billion in April .19
The French government thus agreed to triple the overall amount of credits
within just  months.
When it came to credit conditions, a constant and successful tactic of the Polish
authorities was to play Western countries off against each other. On the occasion
of the first meeting of the Franco-Polish commission in  in Poland, Giscard
paid a visit to Gierek in Warsaw.20 Gierek noted that the French were perceived as
‘excessively rigid’ in contract negotiations, and offered conditions that were inferior
to those of their competitors. During the meeting of the Franco-Polish commission,
Polish authorities asked for easier financial conditions than those included in the
17 AMAE, DE-CE/, Accord de coopération à long terme avec la Pologne,  July . See also
Badel a, pp. –.
18 CAEF, B, Commission intergouvernementale de coopération économique franco-polonaise,
Évolution et situation de l’économie polonaise, October .
19 AMAE, DE-CE/, DAEF, Accords bilatéraux, IIème session de la Commission intergouverne-
mentale de coopération économique,  January .
20 AMAE, DE-CE/, Telegram no./, Audience accordée à Giscard par Gierek, October
.
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October  financial protocol, and Giscard agreed.21 In particular, Giscard granted
a million francs extension to the . billion franc credit if needed, something that
the Poles did not even ask for.22 Giscard explained that this  per cent increase cor-
responded to the rhythm in the increase of trade relations between the two countries.
Polish participants were of course delighted.
The  protocol was due to expire on  December . On  January ,
Polish authorities set out their requests, and asked in particular for further improved
financial conditions for particularly large projects, while obviously the first protocol
had not expired yet. The French foreign ministry agreed to start negotiating a new
financial arrangement, and did not seem unsympathetic to Polish requests. But in
taking stock of the Polish situation as the question of the renewal of the  protocol
was raised, the French finance ministry voiced concerns.23 Head of the Trésor Jacques
de Larosière and the head of the DREE Bertrand de Morel noted that it would be
wise to wait until the end of  and the actual end of the first protocol to discuss
a new one that would start in early . They realised that for political reasons it
may not work that way, in which case they recommended a renewal of the same
dispositions as the  protocol. They explained that these conditions were
already good for Poland, and would not lead to a degradation of France’s credit
conditions.
De Larosière alone voiced a second concern. The head of the Trésor noted that the
conditions of the  protocol were exceptional, and based on the Polish promise of
the sale of copper, which never materialised.24 Renewing that exceptional agreement
would already be a considerable effort from a French perspective. De Larosière further
explained that the French sectors that exported to Poland were currently saturated,
which would further increase the risk. De Larosière concluded that his preference
went for a simple renewal of the  agreement for a limited duration of two years.
After a few months of negotiations, both sides simply agreed to extend for three
years the validity of the  protocol. The new protocol, nicknamed ‘Gierek ’,
covered the - period, for a total of  billion francs, later further increased to 
billion. French reports consistently described the new agreement as a reproduction
of the  protocol, while in effect it was much more than this. The original
 protocol only envisaged a total of . billion francs, which was subsequently
increased to . in October , and then . in April . However, in the frame-
work of the agreement on coal, the Polish and French government reached a com-
21 AMAE, DE-CE/, Telegram no. /, Première session de la commission intergouverne-
mentale franco-polonaise de coopération économique,  October .
22 AMAE, DE-CE/, Première session de la commission intergouvernementale de coopération
économique franco-polonaise (– octobre ),  November .
23 CAEF, B, de Larosière and de Morel to minister, Pologne: Conditions de crédit applicables à
nos exportations de biens d’équipement,  January .
24 Ibid., de Larosière’s final comment in his own name.
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promise on the granting of new French financing facilities to Poland.25 In addition to
the type of facilities existing under the October  agreement (that is, credit lines to
purchase semi-manufactured goods and equipment at rates inferior to the regular
ones), the French government granted private guaranteed credits of a total of 
million francs, to be used within a three-year period. The French government
granted a greater role to banks under that agreement, as they would no longer be
just brokers in the transactions, but would also engage in rollover credits, which
would let them take the risk of the transactions.26
Once again, the political dimension was very significant. The French foreign ministry
kept insisting that the relationship between France and Poland was a special one: ‘So fre-
quent meetings, in such a legal framework for a bilateral cooperation, do not exist for any
other Eastern European country, except with the USSR, which we can be sure keeps a
record of the Franco-Polish meetings and declarations, charters, agreements and proto-
cols.’27 To increase the ceremonial further, the new protocol was not just signed among
civil servants, but between the heads of government in June  in Poland, in order,
very consciously, to provide more importance to the event. Giscard wanted to highlight
the ‘exemplary character of relations between both countries and to give to their cooper-
ation a new impulse’.28 This new impulse, political as it was, occurred just as the first
concerns about Poland’s ability to service its debt began to appear.
V
The equation that Polish authorities needed to solve in order to repay their debts was
straightforward. Poland needed to increase its exports in order to gain hard currency,
and pay for what it borrowed. The problem resided in the fact that Polish exports did
not increase up to the level that was hoped, while Polish imports rose. A way out of
this dilemmawould have been to slow down imports, and improve exports. But limit-
ing imports was unpopular, while modernisation did not happen to the extent needed
to improve Polish exports.
Reports on the evolution of the Polish economy during the period of implemen-
tation of the first financial protocol of  were already very cautious. The French
foreign ministry observed that: ‘A worrying evolution is taking place with regard to
the volume of contracts for goods equipment that are concluded. While between
 and  the amount of these contracts was multiplied by ten … we observed,
in  … that no significant contract has been concluded for more than a year.’29
25 AMAE, DE-CE/, Telegram no. /, Réunion de la commission mixte de coopération, 
February .
26 AMAE, DE-CE/, DAEF, Relations franco-polonaises, Politique de crédit à l’égard de la Pologne,
 June .
27 AMAE, DE/, DAP, Europe, Relations franco-polonaises,  November .
28 Ibid.
29 AMAE, DE-CE/, DAEF, Relations économiques franco-polonaises,  April .
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In the second semester of , both the French Treasury and the French embassy in
Warsaw drew attention to the worrying size of French risks in Poland. The French
ambassador in Warsaw first warned of the worsening of the Polish financial situation:
External debt – on which we have no certainty – is probably around  and  billion dollars
and its service, while it does not reach % of total exports ( billion dollars) as the Poles
repeat to us, nevertheless represents an excessive fraction of the value of the exports to
Western creditor countries (. billion) … Confronted with this situation, the people in
charge [in Poland] considered that politics won and froze the situation for a year in the
hope that by then confidencewill be restored and that some of the measures recently envisaged
will have come to fruition … However, the risk exists of finding oneself in a year in situation
politically unchanged and economically worsened and one discerns poorly how decisions
adjourned today could be taken then.30
In early , the French ambassador in Poland, Louis Dauge, repeatedly highlighted
Polish problems.31 He presciently concluded that ‘Poland will have to request new
loans to foreign governments and banks in order to reimburse the credits that fell
due and to finance the deficit of its current account.’32
Similar concerns came from the Trésor at exactly the same time. In October ,
the Trésor highlighted the fact that Polish indebtedness was ‘significant and growing
fast’.33 The note explained that on  August , global outstanding risk at mid and
long term was at . billion francs, of which . billion was part of governmental pro-
tocols. By late November , it was at . billion dollars, that is  per cent of French
total risks, the third French risk after the USSR and Algeria.34 On the occasion of a
visit by French trade minister André Rossi to Poland in December , De Larosière
took stock of French commitments in that country. De Larosière recalled that Poland
not only benefited from exceptional credit conditions, but also from additional
advantageous financial help within specific agreements such as those related to coal,
the steel industry and cereals.35 De Larosière warned that: ‘the indebtedness of this
country vis-à-vis Western countries … is at a particularly worrying level. In these
conditions, I cannot but recommend the greatest prudence regarding the new
Polish requests, that do not seem to me can be taken into consideration at the
current moment.’36
On  January , Jacques de Larosière wrote to the French minister of econom-
ics and finance expressing his view that ‘An increase of our risks on Poland is
30 CAEF, B, Telegram no. /, Dauge, La situation en Pologne,  October .
31 CAEF, B, Telegram no. /, Dauge,  January .
32 Ibid.
33 CAEF, B, Trésor, Pologne: Situation économique et financière. Relations avec la France, 
October .
34 CAEF, B, DREE, Commission mixte de coopération franco-polonaise,  January .




inappropriate.’37 De Larosière mentions the record trade deficit of . billion dollars
registered by Poland in :
This deficit has been covered by loans and the state of indebtedness of this country is now
worrying …; the burden of external debt vis-à-vis Western countries, which was of 
billion dollars at the end of , is now estimated at  billion dollars, that is, a quarter of
the indebtedness in hard currency of the whole of Eastern European countries. As for debt
service, it now represents  per cent of export revenues. One must conclude that Poland
is the real ‘sick man’ of Europe.38
De Larosière explained that the then outstanding risks on Poland represented  per
cent of the COFACE total risks, while French exports to Poland only amounted to
. per cent of French exports. The Polish authorities’ use of the euro-currency
market to finance Polish imports was another worrying indication, according to
the Trésor.39 The Trésor referred to data from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
to estimate Poland’s use of the euromarkets:  million dollars in ,  in
,  in , and estimated at  in . The Trésor noted again that
French credits were granted ‘at particularly favourable conditions which constantly
provoke comparable requests from other Eastern European countries’ and therefore
called for ‘moderation in our engagements with this country’.40
Later in the same year, in September , the Trésor described again the deteri-
oration of the situation in Poland, and the risks this implied for the French govern-
ment. But this time, the Trésor was more explicit in pointing out French
responsibilities in the worsening of the situation. ‘This country has benefited in a rela-
tively short period from considerable Western credits and loans … Western banks
doubting of the solvability of Poland are more and more reluctant to grant loans.
When Poland realises a loan, it is asked to pay an interest rate that is above .% to
the one practiced on the euro-markets.’41 The Trésor then explicitly spelled out
the political and commercial incentives for the French government to neglect
Polish economic difficulties: ‘In spite of the continued deterioration of the Polish
financial situation, France (and to a lesser extent other Western countries) has been
until then ready to consent, for political as much as commercial reasons, to more
and more significant facilities in order to help Poland mitigate the crisis of its external
payments.’42
From then on, the French embassy in Poland and the French Treasury would not
ceasewarning the rest of the French government of the dangers of the evolution of the
37 CAEF, B, Trésor to minister, Pologne: Financement de nos exportations,  January .
38 Ibid.
39 CAEF, B, Note Trésor, Pologne: Situation économique et financière. Relations avec la France,
 January .
40 Ibid.
41 CAEF, B, Service des affaires internationales, Pologne: situation financière, September .
42 Ibid.
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Polish economic situation. What changed from  was the sense of alarm on the
French side. In March, de Larosière and de Morel wrote to the deputy economics
minister Robert Boulin:
the two directions [Trésor and external economic relations] are preoccupied by the amount
and the growth of our risks with this country [Poland], which risks experiencing difficulties
in honouring its commitments over the coming years, given the importance of the debt
service in convertible currencies. They consider that the greatest prudence should be
imposed with regard to new commitments on this country, the financial situation of which
is fragile. For its part, the Trésor asks that no new facility … be granted to Poland, until its
financial situation has improved.43
On this last request, a handwritten note indicates ‘defeated’ in the margin. And indeed
in communicating his final decision, Boulin indicated that Poland ‘must be placed in
the category of countries under surveillance’, without referring to further detailed
instructions.44 The only substantial change was thus to place Poland among the coun-
tries for which the management of credit insurance risk was the object of a specific
surveillance.45 The French economics minister further decided in July  that
any future modification to the credit conditions usually granted could only be
decided by the minister himself, and any request for a guarantee for contracts above
 million francs should be submitted to him. From this we deduce that before
these decisions of March and July, the decision to lend to Poland was subject to a
fairly lax procedure.
On  September Haberer, who in June succeeded de Larosière who became
managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), told the French eco-
nomics minister that ‘the situation [in Poland] of external debt is worrying’.46 To
Haberer, the financial dynamic had now changed: ‘This indebtedness has reached a
level all the more worrying as the solution to many Polish economic problems will
only be possible by calling other Western credits, which creates more and more reser-
vations among Western banks.’ Polish gross and net indebtedness vis-à-vis Western
countries was multiplied by slightly more than four between  and 
(Table ). Between  and  alone, credits with public support almost
doubled, while banking credits increased by about  per cent (Table ). Finally, in
, COFACE was the Western export credit guarantor most involved in Poland
by far (Table ). Overall, Haberer noted that France was the Western country most
involved in Poland.
43 CAEF, B, de Larosière and de Morel to minister, Fixation des plafonds de risque
d’assurance-crédit pour ,  March .
44 CAEF, B, Boulin to de Larosière and de Morel, Gestion des risques d’assurance-crédit pour
,  March .
45 CAEF, B, Haberer to minister, Pologne: Situation économique et financière. Relations
financières avec la France,  September .
46 Ibid.
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There was therefore ample evidence of early, multiple, repeated, detailed and con-
sistent warnings about the difficulties of the Polish economy since . These warn-
ings called into question Poland’s ability to repay its debts, and pinpointed the
excessive involvement and thus the risks of French investments in Poland. But why
then did French policy eventually not take into account these warnings? As Badel
argues, French president Giscard agreed to take on the economic risk for political
reasons (Badel b). Giscard’s adviser Guy de Panafieu was in particular advocating
support for Poland. Guy de Panafieu was a former member of the DREE, whose pos-
ition was traditionally to encourage and support French exports. De Morel even
explicitly stated in a testimony that ‘There has been an undeniable political dimension
in the risk taken’ (Panafieu and de Morel , p. ). The French foreign ministry’s
depiction of Poland’s situation in  confirms de Morel’s statement: ‘The govern-
ment of Warsaw has faced since  a number of economic and political difficulties.
In order to overcome them, it has obtained the help of the USSR, but has agreed, in
counterparty, to align itself evenmore scrupulously on Soviet positions.’47 The impli-
cit conclusion of this analysis was that if the French government still wanted to
‘detach’ Poland from the USSR, it had to continue helping Warsaw financially.
Table 4. Indebtedness of Poland vis-à-vis Western countries (in billion dollars)
    
Gross indebtedness . . .  .
Net indebtedness . . . . .
Source: CAEF, B, Haberer to minister, Pologne: Situation économique et financière.
Relations financières avec la France,  September . ‘Net indebtedness’ calculated by
susbtracting deposits in euro-currencies held in Western banks.
Table 5. Debt structure of Poland vis-à-vis Western countries (in million dollars)
 
Credits with public support , ,
Banking credits , ,
Other credits , ,
Total of gross indebtedness , ,
Deposits of Poland in Western banks  
Total net indebtedness , ,
Source: see Table .
47 AMAE, DE/, DAP, Europe, Relations franco-polonaises,  March .
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VI
While Polish authorities officially announced their inability to repay their debts and
called for help in March , they had already informally contacted Western cred-
itors, and France first, in . In July , the president of the Polish bank for exter-
nal trade told the head of the DREE, Michel Freyche, that his country’s serious
economic difficulties would create problems for the Poles in reimbursing the matur-
ities due in  and . This represented the ‘first manifestation, albeit unofficial,
of the will of the authorities in Warsaw to embark on the road to consolidation’.48
Giscard swiftly reassured Gierek that France was ready to help Poland.49
But the Polish authorities’ move in mid  must not have come as a surprise to
their French creditors. In January , Haberer had already explained to the minister
that while Poland tried to control the cost of its indebtedness, it was clear that it was
not sure whether it would manage to respect the maturities of the debt already con-
tracted.50 And just as Giscard promised further financial support to Gierek, the Trésor
kept warning about the problems to come. Haberer refused to grant new credits, and
highlighted his repeated calls for caution to theminister in the past months: ‘Given the
indebtedness of Poland we cannot and we must not grant financial credits that are in
fact only used to refinance the external debt of Poland.’51 Haberer provided three
reasons to justify his opposition. First, the French government should stop renegoti-
ating the credit conditions several times a year. This point was, essentially, in the spirit
of the reluctance shown by the Trésor in  when the question of the renewal of
the  financial protocol came to the negotiating table even before the protocol had
expired. Second, the Bern Union – the international organisation for export credit –
was making efforts to ask Western countries to stop providing easy credit to Poland.









Source: see Table .
48 CAEF, B/, Trésor, Dette extérieure de la Pologne, January .
49 CAEF, B/, Haberer to minister, Dette de la Pologne: Compte rendu des entretiens de Deniau
à Varsovie,  September .
50 CAEF, B/, Haberer to minister, Pologne: questions financières,  January .
51 CAEF, B, Haberer to minister, Crédits à la Pologne,  September .
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This point will be explored in further detail below. Third, the last meeting of the
Planning Council [Conseil de Planification] on external trade indicated that France’s
trade policy vis-à-vis Poland should be more cautious given the Polish economic cir-
cumstances. As of June , France was the country most involved in Poland con-
cerning guaranteed trade credits: . billion dollars for France (. billion
francs), . billion dollars for the UK, . billion dollars for Italy,  million
dollars for West Germany, and  million dollars for Japan.52 Shortly after
Poland’s request for rescheduling in March , Haberer again opposed granting
new credits, because these were to be announced before agreeing on the scale of
Poland’s financing needs.53
The Trésor’s cautious analysis and opposition to granting further help appears in
striking contrast with the DREE’s reaction. While the DREE certainly did not try
to hide Polish difficulties, it did not attempt to discourage French investment in
Poland either.54 A traditional cleavage surfaced, between the DREE, keen to
support French exports, and the Trésor, more cautious in its judgement. The exit
from this cleavage was political. Haberer, while duly acknowledging the dilemma
between supporting French exports and preserving French financial interests in the
Polish debt crisis, lucidly observed: ‘The granting of new credits to Poland now
undoubtedly constitutes a political act that must be treated as such. It is at the
highest political level that the interventions of countries in the framework of a multi-
lateral consultation must be agreed.’55
In the midst of the debates of - about whether or not the French govern-
ment should continue helping to refinance Polish debts, the Polish government
kept on playing the competition card among Western lenders regarding credit con-
ditions (Panafieu and de Morel , p. ; Jarza ̨bek , p. ). When seeking
credits, the Polish government clearly and cleverly played the offers of each
country off against each other, and used this competition to its advantage. For
instance, in discussing the future of Franco-Polish economic cooperation, the
Polish vice-minister for external trade Dlugosz put in perspective the Franco-Polish
discussions by describing first the basic framework of the recent agreement signed
between West Germany and the USSR, that is, a -year agreement, with an
initial validity of  years.56 Dlugosz stated that the Polish government would like
to agree on something similar with the French government. Freyche replied that
he was extremely cautious on this and wanted to work instead on the basis of what
already existed between France and Poland. The Trésor also complained that the
52 CAEF, B/, Trésor, Dette extérieure de la Pologne, January .
53 CAEF, B/, Haberer to minister, Nouveaux crédits à la Pologne,  September .
54 CAEF, B, DREE, Relations économiques franco-polonaises,  September .
55 CAEF, B/, Haberer to minister, Nouveaux crédits à la Pologne,  September .
56 CAEF, B, Compte rendu des entretiens entre M. Freyche et M. Dlugosz, Warsaw,  September
.
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Polish authorities were constantly asking for concessions, ‘in spite of (or because of)
the very substantial advantages that we grant them’.57
As problems with the sustainability of Polish debt grew, the international frame-
work of coordination concerning export credits looked clearly unsatisfactory. On
 April , president of the Berne Union Manuel Varela wrote to the
COFACE. He deplored the fact that credit terms [to Poland]
go far beyondwhat is normal in international trade. Poland is an important market, where pur-
chases may already be reaching the limit justified by its capacity to earn foreign exchange. This
is not normally considered to be a good or sufficient reason for agreeing excessive lengths of
credit. To continue to do so can only lead to over-buying by Poland and the risk that the con-
tagion of these abnormal terms will spread to other markets, particularly in Eastern Europe.58
Varela interestingly pinpointed a sort of ‘locked-in’ effect: ‘The practice of agreeing
such terms is now so widespread that no one exporting country can pull back without
fear of losing business to others which do not do so.’59 Varela concluded by urging the
French government ‘to take action so that no agreements conceding abnormal credit
terms should be entered into with Poland with a terminal date later than  June
’.60 With the benefit of hindsight, this deadline is of course telling as it was
already three months after the Polish authorities said they were unable to repay
their debts. The Bern Union was clearly arriving too late to the party. The patent
lack of coordination among Western creditors let the Polish authorities skilfully
and cleverly benefit from competition among them.
But even more surprising was the inability of the Western creditors to form some
sort of cartel among themselves in the first place. Western creditors knew that the
Polish authorities were taking advantage of their lack of coordination, and were con-
stantly driving down interest rates, which meant that the risks to the creditors
increased. In spite of this, Western creditors proved unable to coordinate their pos-
ition. At the G summit in Puerto Rico, credit conditions were discussed but to
no avail (Romano ). Equally inconclusive were discussions about export credit
within the remit of the EEC. Haberer warned about the financial consequences for
France of this competition among lenders, and called for a greater international
coordination, equally to no avail: ‘[the] question to allow Poland to carry on living
on Western credits must not be granted bilaterally in a competitive spirit but
within a more multilateral framework and with the concern to share equitably the
necessary effort’.61
57 CAEF, B, Trésor, Situation économique et financière. Questions financières bilatérales franco-
polonaises, August .
58 CAEF, B, Varela to COFACE, Poland,  April .
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 CAEF, B/, Haberer to minister, Nouveaux crédits à la Pologne,  September .
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In spite of the opposition of the Trésor, French financial support for Poland actually
continued after the Polish authorities’ informal request for rescheduling in July .
The Polish authorities were eager to get extra funds, while the French government
was willing to avoid losses on the other COFACE loans. Haberer and Polish
finance vice-minister Krzak signed a confidential Franco-Polish refinancing agree-
ment on  November . The agreement concerned two-thirds of the debt
maturing in . The French government agreed to a banking credit of ,
billion francs ( million dollars) guaranteed by COFACE.62 The credit was at
market rate plus  per cent, that is, around  per cent, for a duration of eight years
and reimbursable in nine semestrial payments from  (this included a grace
period of . years).63 France was the first Western country to help Poland refinance
its debt, and the only country to do this in . The agreement was a sort of bridge
financing to help Poland over the most difficult period. Instead of the typically sub-
sidised export credit rates from which Poland benefited until then, this new agree-
ment was a government-to-government loan, based on commercial rates. While
waiting to find a global solution, an exchange of letters between Haberer and
Polish authorities in January  prolonged this agreement under similar condi-
tions.64 The French government provided a total of . million francs of new
credits for the first term of , at the market rate, guaranteed by the COFACE,
and to be reimbursed in . years after a waiting period of . years. In addition to
this, in May , the Gierek protocol was renewed for a further five years, under
the same preferential conditions.65
Overall therefore, in spite of the prospect of rescheduling, the French government
decided not only to continue lending to Poland, but to renew existing agreements,
and to provide an additional government-to-government bridge loan to help the
Polish authorities. The reasons for continued French support remained the same as
those advanced to develop economic and financial links with Poland in the first
place, and were reiterated when the first indications emerged that Poland was in eco-
nomic trouble: to detach Poland from the Soviet Union. The French embassy in
Warsaw reported in September  that ‘Moscow has a clear objective, if not a well-
defined strategy to get out of the impasse: the misfortunes of Poland coming from the
freedoms it has taken with the system and its opening to theWest, the path to recovery
naturally goes through the consolidation of socialism domestically and the reinforce-
ment of links with the socialist community externally.’66 If the French government
62 CAEF, B/, Trésor, Exécution de l’accord confidentiel relatif à un crédit financier en faveur de
la Pologne (accord Haberer–Krzak du  novembre ).
63 AMAE, DE/, DE, Situation financière de la Pologne,  August .
64 AMAE, DE/, Confidentiel /EU, Refinancement de la dette polonaise,  January ;
AMAE, DE/, DE, Situation économique de la Pologne,  July .
65 AMAE, DE/, DE, Situation financière de la Pologne,  August .
66 AMAE, DE/, Ambassade de France en Pologne, Le conseiller économique et commercial, La
crise économique polonaise,  September .
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was to pursue its original strategy of ‘detaching’ Poland from the Soviet Union, it had
thus little choice but to keep supporting Poland financially.
VII
This article showed that French authorities at all levels (foreign ministry, finance min-
istry, French embassy in Warsaw) were well aware of France’s excessive financial
involvement in Poland, of Polish economic difficulties, of the associated growing
risk that Poland would be unable to repay its debts, and this from , that is,
well before the Polish authorities revealed their difficulties. The reliability of statistics
was at times pointed out, but regardless of this, the broader picture of Polish economic
weaknesses left the French government in little doubt that the situation was not sus-
tainable. In spite of repeated early warnings, in particular from the Trésor and the
French embassy in Warsaw, the French government not only kept on lending to
Poland, but often did so under improved financial conditions, mainly for political
reasons. While French calculations always took into account the need to promote
French exports in Poland, this was clearly increasingly seen as less important than
encouraging the overcoming of the cold war order through the promotion of eco-
nomic and financial links across the Iron Curtain. From  in particular, the
Trésor clearly spelled out that the financial risks of French involvement in Poland out-
weighed the French interest in promoting exports. But as was generally the rule in
foreign affairs, the French president and his office had the final word. In the
present case, the president consistently disregarded the advice of the Trésor.
The French government’s clear-sightedness and awareness of the risks taken in its
financial support for Poland highlight the responsibility of the creditor in the dynam-
ics leading to the debt crisis. The French government was conscious of the excessive
risks taken in Poland, and in the end played its part in placing the Polish authorities in a
situation in which they would not be able to reimburse their debts. This suggests a
more balanced account in the making of a debt crisis, moving the focus away from
the responsibilities of the debtor, to highlight the contribution of the creditor via
excessive lending. The outbreak of the Polish debt crisis meant that the French gov-
ernment had little choice but to carry on helping Poland. In July  the French
foreign ministry thus noted that ‘the Westerners, besides their political motivations,
are condemned to assist her [Poland] if they want one day to recover what was ori-
ginally invested and keep an economic partner that could become interesting
again’.67 A final aspect emerging from this account is the considerable weaknesses
of international coordination prior to the debt crisis. International cooperation on
export credit guarantees was weak, as the Bern Union proved ineffective, and the
EEC did not set in place a coordination mechanism. Trade policy was not yet well
coordinated at EEC level, and EEC member states used loopholes to circumvent
67 AMAE, DE/, DE, Situation économique de la Pologne,  July .
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new legislation. In sum, this account has shown that a creditor and a lack of
international coordination contributed importantly to the making of a debt crisis.
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